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JUDICIAL REPEAL OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION
A GLARING example of judicial legislation amounting to
a virtual repeal of an ancient New York statute is found
in The People v. Brainard and Harper & Brothers.' The
eminently respectable, widely influential and highly con-
nected corporation of Harper & Brothers and its President,
Brainard, were convicted in the Court of Special Sessions 2
on the charge of having for sale an obscene book. The publi-
cation was the intimate life of a common prostitute. On
appeal to the Appellate Division of the First Department the
conviction was reversed, and the information (charge) dis-
missed as a matter of law. That is the decision which
smashed the anti-obscenity statute, let in the present flood of
obscenity and created the necessity of amending the law.
The statute in question is found in the Penal Law of the
State under the sub-title "Obscene prints and articles." 3
This statute declares it to be a crime to self or have for
sale any "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or dis-
gusting" book. What is left of the law when such a book
can escape its sweeping provisions? And upon what author-
ity did the court rely in letting it through the law?
Here is the answer in the language of Justice Smith who
wrote the prevailing opinion: 4
"That section (New York's anti-obscenity sta-
tute) was construed by the Court of Appeals in People
v. Eastman,5 in which it is said: 'From the context of
the statute it is apparent that it is directed against
lewd, lascivious and salacious or obscene publications,
the tendency of which is to excite lustful and lecherous
desire.' 6 1 venture that no one can read the book and
1 192 App. Div. 816, 183 N. Y. Supp. 452 (1st Dept. 1920).
2 Judgment rendered January 30, 1920.
'Sec. 1141 of the Penal Law, formerly Sec. 317 of the Penal Code.
'Supra Note 1, 192 App. Div. at 820, 183 N. Y. Supp. at 455.
- 188 N. Y. 478, 81 N. E. 459 (1907).
'Ibid. 188 N. Y. at 480, 81 N. E. at 460.
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truthfully say that it contains a single word or picture
which tends to excite lustful or lecherous desire. It
contains the autobiography of a prostitute, but with-
out the recital of any facts which come within the
condemnation of the section as thus interpreted."
The above construction of the statute cited by Justice
Smith as that of the Court of Appeals is not part of the
prevailing opinion. They are the words of Chief Judge
Cullen who wrote a concurring opinion, in which no other
of the seven judges concurred, although two Judges (O'Brien
and Haight) dissented from the prevailing opinion, which
is as follows:
"The court is of opinion that the publication set
forth in the indictment is improper, intemperate, un-
justifiable and highly reprehensible, nevertheless it is'
not 'indecent' as that word is employed in Section 317
of the Penal Code.
The definitions given by the standard lexicogra-
phers are not controlling in deciding its legal signifi-
cation; many meanings as used in ordinary conversa-
tion are also irrelevant.
Section 317 of the Penal Code is found in Chapter
VII, headed as follows: 'Indecent Exposures, Obscene
Exhibitions, Books and Prints, and Bawdy and Other
Disorderly Houses.'
Section 317 opens as follows: 'Section 317. Ob-
scene Prints. 1. A person who sells, lends, gives
away or shows, or offers to sell, lend, or give away, or
to show, or advertises in any manner, or who other-
wise offers for loan, gift, sale or distribution, any
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting
book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper, story paper,
writing, paper, picture, drawing, photograph, figure
or image, or any written or printed matter of an in-
decent character,' (Italics ours).
It is clear from the manner in which the legisla-
ture has used the word 'indecent' that it relates to
obscene prints or publications; it is not an attempt to
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regulate manners, but it is a declaration of the penal-
ties to be imposed upon the various phases of the crime
of obscenity. The word 'indecent' is used in a limited
sense in this connection and falls within the maxim of
noscitur a sociis.
The judgment and order appealed from should be
affirmed."
That is the prevailing opinion and all of it. The lan-
guage quoted by Justice Smith is not there.
The writer has studied the Eastman case from its incep-
tion in the County of Monroe, the original indictment, its dis-
missal by County Judge Benton, the affirmance without opin-
ion of that dismissal by the Appellate Division of the Fourth
Department 7 and the complete record of the case as it was
presented to the Court of Appeals, including of course the
briefs of counsel.
To know just what any court decides, one must first find
out what questions were before the court. In the first place
the prosecution never contended that the printed matter
upon which the indictment was based was obscene, lewd, las-
civious, filthy, indecent or disgusting within the statutory
meaning of those words or any of them as they appear to-
gether in the statute. The indictment was not based upon
those words at all but was based upon the segregated phrase
"or any written or printed matter of an indecent char-
acter" which occurs several lines below the six preceding
adjectives mentioned. "Indecent," as so used the second time
was the one and only word before the court or considered
by it. That was the sole word found in the indictment as
shown by the headnote to the Eastman case and confirmed by
the original record.
The district attorney who carried the appeal to the
highest court did not need to be told that the printed matter
in question did not fall within the meaning of the six pre-
ceding words or any of them. He confessed to that in not
seeking the indictment under them. He thought the printed
matter in question did come within the general meaning of
"116 App. Div. 922 (4th Dept. 1906).
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the word "indecent" as used in the phrase quoted which is
independent of the six preceding descriptive adjectives. He
knew that even if the indictment were based upon the word
"indecent" as it first appears in collocation with obscene,
lewd, lascivious and disgusting, it would not hold, because
"indecent" as there used must be construed within the range
of meaning of its associated words. He sought to avoid this
rule of construction by selecting the one word "indecent"
where it occurs independently of the other words.
As every one knows few adjectives in the language have
a wider diversity of meaning than "indecent." Discour-
teous treatment of a guest for example is commonly char-
acterized as "indecent." One woman may say of another
that she looked "positively indecent" in her unbecoming hat
or gown, or that a neighbor's behavior is "indecent" in dis-
turbing the family quiet. In the Standard Dictionary are
these definitions on indecency: "Offensive to common propri-
ety, offending against modesty or delicacy, immodest, con-
trary to what is fit and proper, unbecoming, inelegant in
form, uncomely."
The district attorney's brief in the Court of Appeals
consists of six short pages mainly made up of selected defini-
tions of "indecent," such as those mentioned, which were
culled from the dictionaries and other authorities to show
that it has a meaning quite removed from the signification
of "obscene" and the other correlated adjectives as they ap-
pear together in the statute.
The Court of Appeals properly held that the position of
the word "indecent" in the independent phrase of the statute,
"any written or printed matter of an indecent character,"
did not take it out of the elementary rule of construction
which requires words to be construed in the light of their
associated words and according to the context. That was
all the Court of Appeals decided.
As to the article which was the subject matter of the
indictment in the Eastman case, the best proof that it was
not obscene is the fact, pointed out by Chief Judge Cullen, of
its incorporation in the dissenting opinion of Judge O'Brien
to appear and remain in the official reports of the court for-
ever. No judge would thus spread upon the records of the
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court an obscene production-certainly not any of the vile
prints which now abound. The article itself is the best
proof that it does not fall within the purview of the anti-
obscenity statute. It was a scurrilous attack upon the
Roman Catholic clergy and begins:
"The Open Door to Hell is the confessional box.
It is hell's gate. The mainspring to lust. The very
embodiment and focus of the virus of hell. It is the
very matter and pus that runs from the corpse in hell.
It is the pollution and rottenness of the decay of
ages," and ends "all unite with me in prayer that the
above will open the eyes of many deceived Romanists
and come to the blood of Christ."
The language used by Eastman is not of the kind against
which the statute is directed. It is coarse and vulgar but it
contains no lesson in vice as do the publications against
which the obscenity statute is aimed. The article is not an
incitement or inducement to immorality but a perfervid de-
nunciation of it. The evils he finds in the confessional are
held up as a warning of its dangers. He uses apt language
for his purpose. The terms he employs are not usually heard
in polite society. His charges were made against the Cath-
olic clergy and were libelous on their face as Judge Benton
pointed out in his opinion upon his dismissal of the indict-
ment. Whether that dismissal was erroneous was the only
question before the Court of Appeals in the Eastman case.
Indeed, while dismissing the indictment as not obscene,
Judge Benton had held the defendant in bail to answer to
another indictment for criminal libel should one be found
under the proper statute S by the next ensuing grand jury.
Eastman's statements were allegations of fact. He had
the absolute right to make them but he could be punished as
for criminal libel if he failed to prove their truth and he was
entitled to an opportunity to do so. So Judge Benton held.
Since neither the Appellate Division nor the Court of Ap-
peals decided to the contrary, Judge Benton's decision re-
mained the law of the case. The majority in the latter court
8 Sec. 1340 of the Penal Law, formerly Sec. 242 of the Penal Code.
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said nothing about the libelous character of the publication
but Chief Judge Cullen discussed it at length, concurring in
the main with Judge Benton.
Even Chief Judge Cullen's individual dictum is not sus-
ceptible of the broad meaning given to it by the Appellate
Division in the Brainard case. He concurred in the pre-
vailing opinion and that must be read as part of his own. In
asserting that the statute is directed against publications
"the tendency of which is to excite lustful and lecherous
desire" he gave a good definition of "lascivious," one word of
the statute, but it fits no other of the six prohibitory adjec-
tives employed. What he says is literally true. The statute is
directed against such publications. But he could not alone
as Chief Judge restrict the meaning of "obscene" for example,
one prohibitory adjective of the statute, to the narrow scope
of his definition, for his own court had unanimously declared
in People v. Muller 9 that the test of an obscene publication
was "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity
is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences, and who might come into contact
with it." 10
All the Chief Judge intended by his casual remark was
to repeat, what he had already agreed to in the prevailing
opinion, that the meaning of "indecent" was limited by the
general scope and intendment of the statute. Nowhere does
he take exception to any part of the prevailing opinion. Yet
this passing remark of Chief Judge Cullen is wrongfully
taken in the Brainard case as the decision of the court and
thus are the two words "filthy" and "disgusting" read out
of the statute altogether and the other words robbed of their
true signification as given to them by the Court of Appeals
in the Muller case, and by countless judicial decisions in
other jurisdictions. Consequently a book dealing with the
life of a common prostitute is held immune from the provi-
sions of the New York statute directed to curb the publica-
tion of immoral books.
Hardly worse than the reversal of the conviction in the
Brainard case was the dismissal of the information as a
-96 N. Y. 408, 411 (1884).
0 Ibid. 412.
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matter of law. That set the precedent, which the magis-
trates and the trial judges have been prompt to follow, of
dismissing charges and indictments without trial. That too
in face of the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals in
the Muller case that "The question whether a picture or
writing is obscene is one of the plainest that can be presented
to a jury.* * * "
It is a noteworthy fact that the magistrate who held the
defendants for trial in the Brainard case, after his rebuff in
the reversal of the conviction and the dismissal of the
information by the Appellate Division, dismissed charges
against three of the foulest books which ever appeared in
print. Moreover he wrote a glowing panegyric upon them
which was worth to the publishers, as advertising matter, an
incalculable sum in the immense sale his approval and praise
of them procured.
The law as laid down in the Brainard case remains the
law to the inferior courts and furnishes the excuse for failure
to prosecute the purveyors of obscenity.
The dominant rule for the interpretation of a statute
requires that the language used, if plain and unambiguous,
must be taken in its ordinary meaning and every word given
full force and effect. Its meaning is that which would be
given to it by a reader of ordinary intelligence. That is one
of the first things taught the law student. Of course simple
words in every-day use have widely different meanings but
that signification must be given to every word which the
context requires to make sense and relevancy. Thus the pri-
mary meaning of the word "rich" is wealthy. But when one
speaks of a rich cake it means something quite different. So
of a "rich" joke, a "rich" color, a "rich" field and so on. But
invariably in good writing the precise meaning to be given to
a word is revealed by the connection in which it is used. That
is all that is meant by the maxim noscitur a sociis applied in
the real decision in the Eastman case. Literally the Latin
words mean, "he is known by his associates." Applied to
words it means that they must be construed in harmonious
relationship to their associated words. Every writer and
speaker, every reader and hearer, unconsciously applies this
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rule. As to the construction of statutes that standard author-
ity, the Cyclopedia of Law says:"
"In the interpretation of statutes words in com-
mon use are to be construed in their natural, plain and
ordinary signification. It is a very well-settled rule
that so long as the language used is unambiguous, a
departure from its natural meaning is not justified by
any consideration of its consequences, or of public
policy; and it is the plain duty of the court to give it
force and effect."
Now the language of the New York anti-obscenity statute
is plain and unambiguous. In People v. Muller it was so
characterized in the unanimous decision of the Court of
Appeals. "It is to be observed," said the court in that case,12
"that the statute does not undertake to define obscene or
indecent pictures or publications. But the words used in the
statute are themselves descriptive. They are words in com-
mon use, and every person of ordinary intelligence under-
stands their meaning, and readily and in most cases ac-
curately applies them to any object or thing brought to his at-
tention which requires judgment as to the quality indicated."
At that time the statute used only the two descriptive
words "obscene" and "indecent." The latter word was the
only one before the court in People v. Eastman, decided
twenty-three years later, although by that time the statute
had been strengthened by adding the four words "lewd,"
"lascivious," "ifilthy" and "disgusting." None of these words,
nor the word "obscene," was before the court in the Eastman
case.
The judge who wrote the prevailing opinion in the
Brainard case has since passed away. No justice who con-
curred in it is now on the bench. But the destructive de-
cision remains and is just as binding upon the lower courts
as any act of the legislature and it will so remain until
changed by legislative enactment. In a criminal case the
people have ordinarily no right of appeal from an acquittal
'36 Cyc. Law Procedure 1114.
'"Supra Note 1 at 410.
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and the defendant of course will not appeal from his own
exoneration. So there is no way of getting to the Court of
Appeals. The legislature is the only hope.
Another obstacle to the enforcement of the New York
statute is a dictum of the Court of Appeals 13 in a case of
malicious prosecution which declares that an obscene publi-
cation must be "considered broadly as a whole." There is no
objection to permitting the triers of fact to examine, read
and consider the whole work, or such portions of it as the
court deems relevant and material, upon the trial. But the
district attorney of New York County erroneously accepted
that dictum as requiring the grand jury, before returning an
indictment, to read the entire work charged as obscene and
then to read it himself to the trial jury, even though only a
few pages may be complained of as violating the law. Grand
juries have not the time to do so and the re-reading on the
trial tires the jury and wastes the time of the court.
This practice is contrary to that of the Federal courts 14
where the indictment may be based upon the objectionable
part or parts of the book, although the language of the New
York and Federal statutes 15 are substantially alike. The
result is that the Federal government successfully prosecutes
offenders against its obscenity statutes while in New York
the enforcement of its statute has almost completely broken
down at the very source of distribution of the great bulk of
the published obscenity circulating throughout the country.
The remedy for this condition is to amend the law so that the
courts will be required to give to the New York statute the
same force and effect as is given to it by the Federal courts.
JOHN FORD.
New York City.
Halsey v. New York Soc., 234 N. Y. 1, 4, 136 N. E. 219, 220 (1922).
" U. S. v. Bennett, 16 Blatchf. 338, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14751 (C. C. N. Y.
1879) ; U. S. v. Benedict, 165 Fed. 221 (C. C. N. Y. 1908).
" Criminal Code, Sec. 211, amended (18 U. S. C. A., Sec. 334).
